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Abstract – 94-009D
We examine the effects of endogenously determined realignment expectations in a model
of a target zone with sluggish price adjustment. We allow these expectations to be based
on a policy rule that generates an increasing probability of realignment as output moves
away from full employment. We find that for realistic parameter values, even relatively
small misalignments of the currency band lead to strongly skewed conditional
distributions for the nominal exchange rate, thus generating pressures for realignment.
We show that the reason for this is that the speed of adjustment in the absence of
realignments is rather slow. Further, we find that the existence of an equilibrium path for
the exchange rate depends on the responsiveness of realignment expectations to
economic fundamentals. Paradoxically, higher credibility may increase the probability
that a target zone will collapse. This feature of the model provides a possible explanation
for the crisis within the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. A policy of monetary
accommodation to real shocks can alleviate the problem but severely constrains a
country’s ability to pursue counterinflationary measures within the band1
Introduction
The theory of managed exchange rate regimes was significantly advanced
by the appearance of Krugman's seminal paper on currency bands (1991). He
showed that one could derive an explicit solution for the path of the exchange
rate within a band in a continuous-time stochastic framework. The model
assumed that the monetary authorities adopted a passive stance to the targeting
of the exchange rate so long as the rate remained strictly within the interior of the
band. Only when the rate reached the margins of the band would the authorities
intervene in order to prevent the rate from moving outside its permitted range.
In addition, it was assumed that “fundamentals” followed an exogenous white-
noise process, and the solution to the model expressed the exchange rate as a
time-stationary, non-linear function of fundamentals.
The original model was intentionally a highly stylized representation of
the kind of managed regime it sought to capture—namely the exchange rate
mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System. It provided some key
insights into the way that such regimes might operate. In particular, intermittent
and state-contingent intervention was shown to stabilize the rate within the
band, even when such intervention was not occurring. The anticipation of such
activity by the market was sufficient to move the exchange rate closer to the
center of the band.
 In the simplest case, the band was supposed to be fully credible. In other
words, the market did not expect that any realignments of the band would ever
occur. In fact, periodic realignments of central parities have been a persistent
feature of the ERM. For example, there were six realignments of the French franc
against the DM over the period 1979-1992. So it quickly became evident that any
complete theory of currency bands would have to incorporate the possibility of
such realignments. The first papers to do so (see Miller and Weller (1989), Bertola
and Caballero (1992), Svensson (1992) and Bertola and Svensson (1993)) assumed
the existence of ad hoc rules or stochastic processes which were known to the2
market, but which had no explicit economic underpinning. But there is now
accumulating empirical evidence that realignment expectations are influenced by
economic variables such as the level of output and employment, the real
exchange rate and the money supply (Edin and Vredin (1993), Mizrach (1995)).
Our aim is to examine how realignment expectations that are based on a
particular policy rule for the government may affect the operation of a target
zone. We consider a rule that generates an increasing probability of realignment
as output moves away from full employment. The investigation uses a richer and
more realistic model of exchange rate determination than the monetary model,
which underpins the Krugman approach and its extensions. In addition to
describing the adjustment of nominal exchange rates and interest rates, it is
capable of generating endogenous dynamics for output, real interest rates and
the real exchange rate (Miller and Weller, 1991). The domestic price level takes
the place of the velocity of money as the fundamental which drives the exchange
rate, and in contrast to the assumption of perfect price flexibility central to the
monetary model, it is assumed that prices adjust less than instantaneously to
supply side shocks. There are strong arguments to indicate that sluggish price
adjustment must play an important role in explaining short-run movements in
real and nominal exchange rates (see, for example, Mussa (1986), Krugman (1989,
chapter 1), McCallum (1996, chapter 8) and Clarida and Galí (1994)). The
endogenous dynamics for output and inflation permit the more realistic
approach to modelling realignment expectations described above.
As a benchmark for comparison, we examine the process of adjustment to
misalignment when the band is fully credible. We find that for realistic
parameter values even relatively small misalignments of the band lead to
strongly skewed conditional distributions for the nominal exchange rate. This
generates pressures for realignment because the speed of adjustment of output
and employment in the absence of realignments is rather slow. This casts3
considerable doubt on the wisdom of imposing the “discipline” of a target zone
with an overvalued central parity as a means of curbing inflation.
Our analysis demonstrates that there may not exist an equilibrium path
for apparently plausible endogenous realignment expectations. Whether or not
such a problem of sustainability arises depends on the way in which realignment
expectations respond to deviations of output from full employment.
Paradoxically, lack of sustainability is more likely the higher is the initial level of
credibility and the less it erodes in response to deteriorating economic
fundamentals. Our model is thus able to reproduce one of the more puzzling
features of the EMS crisis in the autumn of 1992, namely that it occurred at a time
when the credibility of the regime was historically high. Adopting a policy of
monetary accommodation to real shocks can alleviate the problem of
sustainability. However, the degree of accommodation required may be very
high.
We show that even quite infrequent realignments markedly increase the
speed of adjustment to misalignments. The reason for this is that they are most
likely to occur when most needed i.e. when output has deviated substantially
from full employment, and the period of adjustment under a fully credible band
would be prolonged.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present the model and
introduce a general formulation of the realignment process.  In Section 2 we
provide motivation for the particular form of endogenous realignment
probability we use. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we analyze as benchmarks the cases
of a freely floating exchange rate and a fully credible target zone. In the fully
credible case we conduct simulations to determine the effects of misalignment of
the band. In Section 3.3 we examine realignment rules of increasing generality
based on an objective function for the government. First, we treat the case where
the probability of realignment is a constant. Next, we consider the case where the
probability is a step function of the level of output, and finally where it is a4
continuously variable function of output. In Section 3.4 the effect of introducing
forward-looking prices is considered. A policy of accommodating price shocks is
examined in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 simulations of the endogenous
realignment rule with variable realignment probability are presented. Summary
and conclusions follow in the final section.
1. The Model
The basic model we use is that presented in Miller and Weller (1991),
modified to allow for the presence of an endogenously determined realignment
probability. It is a stochastic version of the well-known “overshooting” model of
exchange rate determination (Dornbusch, 1976). The central feature that
distinguishes it from the monetary model is that goods prices are not assumed to
adjust instantaneously to clear all markets.
The model consists of the following equations:
mt pt yt it () () () () −= − κ λ (1)
yt it Ed pt d t st pt () (() [ () ] ) (() () ) =− − + − γ η (2)
Ed st d t it i [( ) ] ( ) * =− (3)
dp t y t y dt dz t () ( () ) () =− + φ σ (4)
All variables except interest rates are measured in logs. The first equation
describes the condition for equilibrium in the domestic money market, where
m(t) is the domestic money supply, p(t) is the domestic price level, y(t) is the level
of output and i(t) is the (nominal) domestic interest rate. The second equation is a
goods market equilibrium condition, in which investment depends negatively on
the real interest rate, and output depends positively on the real exchange rate s(t)5
– p(t). Here, s(t) is the domestic (dollar) price of foreign currency, so that an
increase in the value of s(t) – p(t) corresponds to an increase in competitiveness.
The third equation is an uncovered interest parity condition, in which the
expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency is set equal to the nominal
interest differential. It will incorporate the possibility of jumps in the exchange
rate that occur as a consequence of a realignment. The final equation is a simple
representation of less-than-instantaneous price adjustment. When output is
above its long-run full employment level y – , there is a tendency for prices to rise
and vice versa. The speed of price adjustment is captured by the parameter φ.
The stochastic element of the model consists of a random real shock, where dz(t)
is the increment to a standard Wiener process z(t) and σ  is a volatility parameter.
In what follows we drop explicit identification of time-dependence unless









































































and D = κγ + λ − φγλ. To simplify notation, we redefine the variables to be
deviations from some initial long-run equilibrium of the deterministic system.
The corresponding initial value for the money supply m we normalize to zero.
































The variable m is now interpreted as a change in the money supply from
the initial value. The system can be written in this form because money is neutral
in the model in the long run. This, however, does not preclude money from
having important real effects in the short run.
 We model realignments as driven by a jump process ν(t), whose mean
arrival rate is endogenously determined. We suppose that ν(t + dt) – ν(t) is a
Poisson-distributed random variable with characteristic parameter π(s – m, p –
m). Thus dν(t) = 0 with probability 1 – π(s – m, p – m)dt + o(dt) and dν(t) = 1 with
probability π(s – m, p – m)dt + o(dt). The size of jump is denoted by ∆(s – m, p –
m).  Therefore, at this stage, we allow both π(s – m, p – m) and the size of
realignment to be arbitrary functions of the deviation of the nominal exchange
rate and price level from long run equilibrium levels.1 In Sections 2 and 3.3 we
introduce additional structure to these functional relationships.
Solutions to the model are obtained by postulating a deterministic
relationship between the nominal exchange rate, the money supply and the price
level:
smf pm =+ − () (7)
By applying Ito’s Lemma, extended to incorporate the presence of the jump
process ν,
2we obtain
ds f p m dt f p m dp f p m p m d = ′′ −+ ′ −+ −− ( ) () () ( () ,) σν
2 2 ∆ (8)
                                                          
1 We will sometimes refer loosely to the function π as the probability of realignment.7
 from which it follows that
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Substituting for E[ds] and E[dp] from (6) gives
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where aij denotes the appropriate element of the matrix A. The solution to this
differential equation subject to appropriate boundary conditions provides the
necessary characterization of the exchange rate within a target zone.
3
2. The Endogenous Realignment Probability
In the previous section we introduced a fairly general expression for the
intensity of realignment. We now add more structure in order to provide
economic content to the specification of the realignment process. Let us first
consider the size of realignment. We assume that the width of the target zone is
some fixed amount. The position of the zone at time t can then be defined in
terms of its central parity ck(t), where k is an index of the number of realignments
that have occurred since time zero. The size of a realignment at t can be written
in terms of the change in central parity, ck+1(t+) – ck(t).4 To fix the size of
realignment, we assume that when a realignment occurs, there is a simultaneous
monetary adjustment sufficient to place the new value of the exchange rate at
PPP at the midpoint of the new band. This captures in a simple way the idea that
realignments are designed to short-circuit the process of adjustment to long-run
                                                                                                                                                                            
2See, for example Merton (1990), ch.3, p.92.
3 The nature of these solutions in the fully credible case (π = 0) is analyzed at length in
Miller and Weller (1991, 1995).
4 We use the notation t+ to indicate the time just after t.8
equilibrium with full employment and stable prices. It implies that ck+1(t+) = s(t+)
= m(t+) = p(t). Therefore, the jump in the exchange rate caused by the realignment
is s(t+) – s(t) = p(t) – s(t), where s(t) denotes the value of the exchange rate at the
instant before the realignment occurs. Similarly, the jump in the money supply is
m(t+) – m(t) = p(t) – m(t). In all cases the variable determining the size of these
various jumps is p(t). Note that in general ck(t) ≠ m(t). This is because the money
supply may have changed since the last realignment as a consequence of
marginal intervention to defend the band.
In the fully credible case where the probability of realignment is zero, the
money supply adjusts only as a consequence of infinitesimal adjustment at the
margins to defend the band. But where the band is not fully credible, there is a
second source of variability resulting from the realignment process.
We move next to considering the determinants of the probability of
realignment per unit of time, π(s – m, p – m). To avoid unnecessary technicalities,
which arise in continuous time, we develop the argument in the context of the
discretized version of the model used in the simulations. We suppose that the
government’s commitment to maintaining a fixed target zone reflects its desire
for (long-run) price stability. In other words, the benefits of the target zone are
measured in terms of the reduction in price variability resulting from the
periodic intervention necessary to defend the zone.5 We assume that the
government trades off the objective of maintaining the target zone against that of
stabilizing output at full employment. We capture this in the following loss
function:
                                                          
5 At the opposite extreme of the policy continuum would be the situation in which the
government fully accommodates the exogenous price shocks, in which case output is
stabilized at full employment, but the price level follows a Brownian motion, with
variance which grows linearly with t.9
() Lt z yt y z Ct () ( )| () | () =− − + 1 no realignment (11)
The first term on the right-hand side represents the component of the loss
function accounted for by deviations from full employment at time t, conditional
on no realignment occurring at time t, and the second is a fixed cost associated
with a realignment. The variable z is an indicator, which takes the value 0 if no
realignment occurs at time t, and takes the value 1 if a realignment occurs. The
fixed cost C(t) ≥ 0 is assumed to be random and unobservable by market
participants. However, we suppose that the market knows its distribution. The
decision problem faced by the government is very simple. If, in the absence of a
realignment |( ) | yt y −  is less than C(t), no realignment occurs in period t. If the
first term is greater than or equal to C(t), a realignment occurs and the first term
goes to zero. Therefore the optimized value of the loss function can be expressed
as:
() () Lt y t y C t
*() m i n | () | , () =− no realignment
 We can then calculate the probability of a realignment in period t as:
() () t realignmen no | ) ( | ) ( ) at time t realignmen ( y t y t C P t P − ≤ = (12)
This enables us to write the probability of realignment in period t as some
increasing function of the (absolute value of the) deviation from full
employment.6 The expression in (12) also allows for a separate dependence upon
                                                          
6 This formulation is sufficiently general to allow for the possibility of a positive
probability of realignment at full-employment output. It requires the assumption of a
mass point at zero in the distribution of C(t).10
time, as a consequence of changes in the distribution of C(t). Such a change might
occur, for example, as a result of a change in government. We choose not to
consider the case of time-variation in the distribution of C(t), but write the
realignment probability as
π π (| ( ) |); yt y − ′         > 0. (13)
Although evidently a stylized view of the determinants of a realignment, it
nevertheless captures some important features of reality. The idea that there are
fixed costs associated with the loss of credibility which comes with a realignment
is not new (Froot and Rogoff 1991, Obstfeld 1996). Assuming that the fixed costs
are random is a way of expressing the idea that governments are not
homogeneous entities, but rather collections of competing interests.7 With this
formulation we abstract from the possibility that the market may learn about the
objective function of the government and the associated reputational
considerations.
3. A Comparison of Different Regimes
We want to examine the different implications for the behavior of the
exchange rate and other economic variables that emerge from our model when it
is analyzed under differing assumptions about the exchange rate regime. We
consider three scenarios: (i) a freely floating exchange rate, (ii) a fully credible
target zone, (iii) a partially credible target zone with endogenously determined
realignment expectations. A structural model similar to the one laid out in
equations (1) – (4) has been estimated by Ghosh and Masson (1991) on data for
the United States and the rest of the world. All parameters other than φ, the
                                                          
7 This is well illustrated in the case of the U.K., where the influence of the Eurosceptic
wing of the Conservative Party has varied considerably over time. Views on the cost11
speed of price adjustment, and σ, the instantaneous variability of prices, are the
estimates obtained in their paper.  The parameter values for the model are given
in Table 1. In order to maintain comparability with the simulations reported later
in the paper, we assume that the unit of time in the analysis is a quarter.
3.1 The Free Float
The free float is characterized by a fixed money supply and a zero
probability of realignment.
8 The differential equation in (10) with π = 0 has two
linear solutions which correspond to the stable and unstable arms of the
saddlepath in the deterministic model, where σ = 0. The stable saddlepath, SS, in
Figure 1, (the “free float” solution) is shown with a negative slope. The negative
slope is guaranteed if κη + φγ < 1, and corresponds to the "overshooting" case.
9
The economy may move in either direction along SS in response to the price
shocks modelled by the process z(t). The exchange rate is asymptotically
normally distributed with mean equal to the long-run equilibrium value of the
associated deterministic model.
Using the parameter values laid out in Table 1 with φ  set to 0.6, the slope
of the stable saddlepath takes on a value of –2.11, implying that a one per cent
reduction in real balances is accompanied by an appreciation of 2.11% in the
                                                                                                                                                                            
associated with a realignment among Eurosceptics would certainly diverge sharply from
those in the main body of the party.
8In a fully articulated two-country model the money supply would be measured relative
to that in the foreign country. A relative money supply of zero allows for the possibility
of a constant trend common to both countries.
9Overshooting imposes an upper bound on the speed of price adjustment φ given values
for the other parameters of the model. Note also that saddlepoint stability requires that the
determinant of the matrix A be negative. This implies the condition φλ < κ + γλ.
Therefore, even in the absence of overshooting, the speed of price adjustment cannot be
allowed to increase arbitrarily without simultaneously reducing the interest semi-
elasticity of money demand λ in order to satisfy the bound on the term φλ. We cannot
then regard the monetary model as a special case of the one we analyze.12
nominal exchange rate.
10 This corresponds to the overshooting case, since in the
new long-run equilibrium the exchange rate appreciates by 1.00%. The initial
appreciation is therefore followed by a period in which the exchange rate
depreciates to the new long-run equilibrium.
  We can also use the model to describe the process of price adjustment.
Since output is a linear function of the price level and the exchange rate, and in
the free float the exchange rate is a linear function of the price level, the price
adjustment process can be written as:
dp pdt dz =− + ρ σ (14)
whereρ
φ




(() )  and θ is the slope of the stable saddlepath. For the
chosen parameter values ρ has the value 0.30. So prices follow an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process with speed of mean reversion equal to 0.30. The long-run
equilibrium price level is normalized to zero, so that if the value of p is currently
p0, its expected value at some future time t is given by
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10This is somewhat rather larger than the figure of – 1.35 implied by the impulse response
results to a nominal shock reported by Clarida and Galí (1994) for the US-Germany case.13
3.2 The Fully Credible Case
In order to provide an appropriate benchmark against which to compare
the effects of various forms of realignment expectations, we consider first the
case of a perfectly credible zone initially placed symmetrically about the long run
equilibrium value of the exchange rate. The values of the exchange rate at the top
and bottom of the band have been chosen to mimic the “narrow” band of the
EMS (a permitted range of variation of ± 2.25% around a central parity). The
money stock is held fixed so long as the nominal exchange rate stays strictly
within the interval (,) ss
− . However, when the rate reaches the limits of its
permitted range of variation, the central bank adjusts the money supply to
defend the zone. As a consequence, the money supply is subjected to random
shocks over time, and each of these brings about a shift in the long-run
equilibrium value of the exchange rate. Because a target zone is by assumption
fixed in nominal terms, its position relative to the long-run equilibrium value of
the exchange rate will shift as the money supply changes. For a given level of the
money supply, the (fully credible) solution path for the exchange rate is
described by (10), with π set to zero, together with the smooth pasting boundary
conditions, which require that the path be tangent to the top and bottom of the
zone. As the non-linear solutions to (10) are not obtainable in closed form, we use
a numerical “shooting” technique to solve for the equilibrium path of the
exchange rate that satisfies the appropriate boundary conditions for varying
levels of the money supply. Since the exchange rate follows an Ito process,
simulating its movement over time involves using a suitable approximation in
discrete time. We use the Euler approximation to the continuous-time process
that describes the time path of the price level.
For a given level of the money supply m0, the stochastic differential
equation describing the movement of prices is given by:14
[] dp a p m a f p m dt dz =− + −+ 11 0 12 0 ()() σ (15)
 For n periods per unit of time, p
n is the discrete-time process defined by:
[] pp
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where ε1, ε2, …  is an i.i.d. sequence of standard normal variables. This defines a
corresponding discrete-time process for the exchange rate, s
n, through the
functional relationship sf p m t
n
t
n =− () 0 .
Determining the distribution of the exchange rate involved the following
procedures. First, solution paths for differing levels of the money supply were
found. Next, a starting value for the exchange rate was selected at its initial long-
run equilibrium value in the centre of the band. Then 100 simulations consisting
of 50 time periods were constructed according to the procedure described above.
If the exchange rate reached s – , the money supply m would be reduced by a
discrete intervention. Conversely, if the exchange rate reached s , the money
supply would be increased by an intervention of the same size. Whenever m
changed as a consequence of intervention, the exchange rate would move to a
new solution path within the band.
Comparing the exchange rate distributions in Figure 2, one finds that the
volatility parameter σ is a central determinant of the shape of the distribution.
With σ set at 0.007 in the upper panel, the model generates a U-shaped
distribution that is qualitatively very similar to that found in the simple
Krugman model. However, with σ set at 0.004 in the lower panel, a very different
picture emerges. Lowering the variance of the price shock concentrates the
exchange rate distribution in the centre of the band, in accordance with empirical15
observation.
11 In both cases the real exchange rate is more variable than the
nominal rate, reflecting the fact that a rise in relative prices leads to a reduction
in real balances and drives up the interest rate and exchange rate. The fall in
competitiveness caused by the rise in prices is thus accentuated by a rising
exchange rate.
When we consider a wider band in which the rate can vary by ± 5%
around a central parity, we find that the larger value for the volatility parameter
will still produce a concentration of observations in the middle of the band (see
the upper panel of Figure 3). Intuitively, the reason for this result is clear: a wider
band allows the intrinsic mean-reverting tendency of the nominal exchange rate
to reveal itself without being obscured by the truncating effects of intervention at
the edges of the band.
3.2.1. Misalignment of the Band
When the authorities impose a nominal band on the exchange rate, there
will inevitably be periods of misalignment during which the band will have an
over- or undervalued central parity. Since one of the issues under investigation is
the extent to which such misalignments generate pressures for realignment, it is
important first to examine the effects when the band is fully credible. The next
case to be analyzed, therefore, is one in which the band is centred on an
undervalued exchange rate (see the lower panel of Figure 3). The central parity is
set at 0.05, which corresponds to an undervaluation of 5%. The distribution of the
nominal exchange rate is considerably skewed, more so than that of the real
exchange rate or prices. This is a reflection of the fact that an undervalued
exchange rate stimulates the level of output, putting upward pressure on prices
and interest rates. This causes the exchange rate to strengthen in the band and
                                                          
11This property of the price-inertia model was noted by Sutherland (1994), who derived
the distribution of the exchange rate for an arbitrary set of parameter values using series
expansions.16
increases the frequency with which the monetary authorities have to intervene to
defend the band by increasing the money supply. It is this mechanism of
adjustment that is of particular interest, because realignments can be seen as a
way of “short-circuiting” the process in order to speed up the correction of any
misalignment. In Figure 4 we illustrate the process of adjustment to
misalignment. The graphs show the plots of the fifth, median and ninety-fifth
percentiles of the sample distributions for prices, output, the money supply,
nominal and real interest rates and the real exchange rate over time. About half
the necessary adjustment to output occurs over eight periods, but the full
adjustment takes between fifteen and twenty periods. The pattern of adjustment
for the real exchange rate is similar, although full adjustment takes longer. If the
value of φ is reduced to 0.2, the speed of adjustment is in all cases much reduced.
This is illustrated in Figure 5. An exactly symmetric picture emerges in the case
of an overvalued exchange rate. In both situations it is of course true that the
monetary authority could pursue a path of faster adjustment by suitable
intramarginal changes to the money supply. But the point we are making is that
such changes are not mandated by the commitment to maintain a fully credible
target zone. What this suggests is that relying solely on the equilibrating effects
of the adjustments to monetary policy needed to defend an exchange rate band
will lead to prolonged periods of over- or undervaluation.
3.3 The Partially Credible Case
The previous section indicates that there are significant costs to allowing
the exchange rate to adjust to overvaluation resulting from a misaligned band.
These costs take the form of prolonged periods of unemployment. When the
misalignment is substantial, the short-run political impact of the costs of gradual
adjustment may make a fixed target zone untenable. Because of this,
realignments have been a relatively common feature within the EMS.17
In order to analyze the effects of possible realignments, we need to return
to the model described in Section 1. There we showed that the path of the
exchange rate within the band was described by the solution to (10), subject to
suitable boundary conditions. The particular parametrization for the function
π in (13) that we adopt is:
π(| ( ) |) ( )
|() | yt y a e b
kyt y −=− +
−− 1 . (17)
This function has the desired property of being monotonically increasing in
deviations of output from full employment. It is also sufficiently flexible to allow
the minimum, the maximum, and the rate of change of the realignment
probability to be varied.
The appropriate boundary conditions for the solution path are the same
smooth-pasting conditions that apply in the fully credible case.
12 However, in
sharp contrast to the fully credible case, where the existence of a unique
equilibrium path is guaranteed for all bandwidths, subject only to the parameter
restrictions required to preserve saddlepoint stability, now it emerges that the
existence and nature of equilibrium paths is sensitive to the particular
parametrization of the function π. Considering two special cases of the
specification of π in (17) sheds light on this result.
3.3.1. A Constant Realignment Probability
If k is set to zero in (17), the rate of realignment becomes a constant. Then
we may rewrite (10) as:
                                                          
12This is because the form of realignment rule requires one to solve for the solution path
conditional on no realignment occurring.18
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The value of the constant coefficients on (p – m) and f(p – m) are changed, but
otherwise the form of the equation is the same as in the case where π is zero. In
particular, there will still exist a linear solution corresponding to the stable
saddlepath. The effect, then, upon the solution path of increasing π from zero can
be analyzed simply by considering the induced changes in the two coefficients. It
is straightforward to show that increasing π rotates the stable saddlepath SS in
Figure 1 counterclockwise. Eventually the system moves from the overshooting
case (a21 > 0) to the undershooting case (a21 < 0). Now, as the price level rises
above its long-run equilibrium value, the exchange rate depreciates and the
equilibrium path within a correctly aligned band, i.e., whose midpoint coincides
with PPP, will be tangent to the top (weak) edge. In the limit, as π is allowed to
become arbitrarily large, the band is in effect realigned continuously. At the same
time SS approaches the PPP locus. We are back to the case of a free float, but with
the important difference that real shocks are instantaneously accommodated. So
the nominal exchange rate will wander along the PPP locus driven by the white-
noise shocks to the pricing equation.
3.3.2. A Step Function for the Realignment Probability
We next consider a simple step function for π, and analyze it first in the
context of an otherwise deterministic model. We suppose that π = 0 so long as y´
< y < y´´, and that π = πmax > 0 if y > y´´ or y < y´. The two trigger points for a
positive realignment probability are equidistant from the full-employment level
of output, so that y´´ – y – = y – – y´. The arbitrage equation takes the form:
* ) ( )) ( ) ( ( i t i t s t p dt ds − = − + • π (18)19
where ds/dt is the rate of change of the exchange rate conditional on no
realignment occurring. One can think of there being two regimes, one
corresponding to the situation where π = 0, the other to the case where π = πmax.
The two regimes have stable saddlepaths of SS and S‘S‘, respectively (see Figure
6). In the absence of exogenous shocks only one realignment will ever occur,
since when it does the system moves instantaneously to the long-run equilibrium
and stays there. What happens at the edges of the band is not of interest to us,
and so we assume that all the movements of the system take place in the interior
of the band. Then the stable saddlepath will take the form of the locus ABOCD in
the figure. Points B and C correspond to y = y´´ and y = y´ respectively. If the
system reaches either point without a realignment having occurred, the
probability of one taking place drops to zero and the exchange rate adjusts to
equilibrium at O along the path SS. The sections AB and CD represent paths in
the phase diagram for the system when π = πmax > 0. The phase diagram has the
stable saddlepath rotated counterclockwise to S´S´. We see that if the economy
starts with the price level lying above its long-run equilibrium level, say at p*,
and πmax is not too small, there will initially be a period of exchange rate
appreciation followed, if no realignment occurs, by a period of depreciation. Had
there been no time during which the probability of devaluation was positive,
there would have been steady depreciation along SS. And had the realignment
probability been everywhere constant at πmax, there would have been steady
appreciation along S´S´.
We now reintroduce stochastic shocks into the price equation, and
consider first a small realignment probability. In the absence of a band we would
observe a solution path something like ROR in Figure 7, in which the kinks in the
deterministic case are smoothed. There is a regime shift along the locus Y´Y´
where y = y´. There will also exist a path such as R´OR´ which passes through a
point of inflection when its first derivative is zero. This is the equilibrium path20
for the maximum sustainable bandwidth.
13 This result can be better understood
by considering the following example. Suppose that a fully credible, correctly
aligned band with lower margin at s has a smooth pasting solution at point A in
Figure 8, and that at this point output is at y0 and the nominal interest rate at i0.
Along the locus y = y0 the relationship between s and p is given by:
sD yy p =− + + () ( ) ( ) λη γ λη 0 1 (19)
and along the locus i = i0 is given by:
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Now suppose that when output reaches y0, the realignment probability π jumps
from zero to πmax = (* ) () ii p s 0 −− . This has the effect of introducing an expected
increase in s, i.e., a devaluation, which exactly offsets the interest differential. The
expected depreciation of the exchange rate within the band conditional on no
realignment, given by (* ) () ii p s 0 −− − π , is reduced to zero. Next, consider the
existence of a solution path smoothly tangent to the margin of a slightly wider
band. It is straightforward to rule out as candidates paths lying above OA. But
any path lying below it will intersect the locus y = y0 at a point such as B where
there is a lower interest differential than at A and the size of potential
devaluation (p – s) is larger, since the slope of the locus of constant output is
greater than one. This must imply that the expected appreciation of the exchange
rate conditional on no realignment becomes strictly positive. The path switches
from being convex in p to being concave in p. Therefore there is no solution path
                                                          
13A regime shift formally similar to the one described here is analyzed in Miller and
Weller (1995). The paper also provides a detailed exposition of the qualitative techniques
which allow one to deduce the existence of a path such as R´OR´.21
through the origin (a necessary property for a correctly aligned band) tangent to
the edge of the wider band.
The role of overshooting in this apparently paradoxical result should be
stressed. One's intuition suggests that defending a target zone in the presence of
significant devaluation expectations is simply a question of committing to raising
interest rates to whatever level is needed to compensate holders of the currency
for the expected capital loss. But here the price shocks that lead to an overvalued
currency also produce the monetary tightening that causes nominal appreciation
within the band. Thus a defense of the band involves expansionary intervention
to check any rise in interest rates that would lead to further appreciation. In the
example just presented, such intervention is inconsistent with the arbitrage
requirement that interest rates rise in the presence of heightened devaluation
expectations.
This result is dependent upon two factors: the point within the band at
which the realignment probability jumps, and the level to which it jumps. If the
point at which it adjusts is sufficiently close to the middle of the band, and if the
level is large enough to give S'S' a positive slope (as in Figure 9), then there will
exist equilibrium paths which become tangent to the top (weak) edge of the
band. The reason for this is as follows. If the market anticipates a sharp loss of
confidence (represented by a jump in the realignment probability) close to the
middle of the band, that expectation is sufficient to cause the currency to
depreciate in response to a positive price shock at full employment. When the
loss of confidence actually occurs, since it is by assumption not accompanied by
any change in the nominal interest rate, investors must now expect the currency
to appreciate if they are to continue to be willing to hold it. Because the currency
is in the weak half of the band, this expectation of future appreciation is
                                                                                                                                                                            
14Note that the slope of the locus described in (20) depends upon whether one assumes
that overshooting occurs, in which case 1 - κη - φγ > 0.22
consistent with the effect of marginal intervention to defend the currency at the
weak edge of the band.
3.3.3. A Continuously Variable Realignment Probability
Although these examples illustrate the theoretical possibility that
endogenously variable realignment expectations may lead either to nonexistence
of equilibrium paths within the band, or to a shift from overshooting to
undershooting, it is of course important to determine whether these are practical
possibilities. For this purpose we return to the more general specification in (17),
in which the realignment probability can vary continuously with the deviation of
output from full employment. We first compute numerical solutions for the path
of the exchange rate within a correctly aligned band placed symmetrically about
the long-run equilibrium.
Figure 10 illustrates the possibility that bands wider than some critical
value may not be sustainable.15 The example uses the parameter values of Ghosh
and Masson (1991) in Table 1 and sets φ = 0.5 and σ = 0.008. The upper panel
shows two paths for the exchange rate through the origin, one with a very
slightly steeper slope there. The lower panel plots the associated values of π. One
might question the empirical relevance of this case, given that it requires that
devaluing realignments occur when the currency is in the strong half of the band.
But a similar situation can arise in a more realistic situation if we allow the band
to be centered on an overvalued central parity. For an overvaluation of five per
cent we would observe the exact reversal of the case illustrated in Figure 3. The
exchange rate distribution is skewed to the weak edge of the band. The
equilibrium path lies everywhere below PPP, so that any realignment involves a
devaluation. Realignments are now most likely to occur when the exchange rate
                                                          
15We confirm this hypothesis with extensive numerical work which fails to find well-
behaved smooth-pasting solutions for wider bandwidths.23
is in the weak half of the band when nominal interest rates are high and output is
low.16
We illustrate in Figure 11 the case of a band whose central parity is 5.25%
overvalued. Parameter values are the same as for Figure 10, except that we
return for simplicity to assuming a step function for the realignment probability.
In the top left panel of the figure we show two paths for the exchange rate. One is
the high credibility equilibrium path for the misaligned band (π is constant at
0.05). The other has a step function for π, shown in the bottom right panel. Over
most of the band π is set at 0.05 as before. But it now jumps to πmax = 0.15 close to
the lower edge. This has exactly the effect discussed in the example at the end of
Section 3.3.2. The anticipated loss of credibility near the edge of the band renders
it unsustainable.
An interesting feature of this example is that it demonstrates clearly how a
crisis can occur even when current circumstances do not look particularly bad. If
the band is initially sustainable, devaluing realignments will occur relatively
infrequently, and will be more likely to be observed when the rate is in the weak
half of the band. This is a consequence of the skewed distribution within the
band. If the exchange rate is close to the weak edge of the band, output will near
its full employment level. Suppose now that the market were to change its
expectation of realignment in the event that output were to fall fairly
significantly from its present level. Despite the fact that this is rather unlikely it is
sufficient to generate a crisis now.
In Figure 12 we return to considering the case of a correctly aligned band.
This example illustrates how increasing the sensitivity of the realignment
probability to deviations from full employment generates equilibrium paths
which undershoot and are tangent to the top edge of the band. If this happens,
                                                          
16 In a comprehensive sample of realignments within the EMS over the period 1979-93,
we found, using daily data, that in only 22% of cases had the exchange rate been above24
intervention now has an effect consistent with arbitrage requirements in the
currency market and the problem of sustainability disappears. The parameters
used to generate the solution path shown are the same as in Figure 10 except that
the realignment probability is dramatically increased. In order to compare the
two cases we note that the value of the parameter π is the expected number of
realignments per quarter. In Figure 10 the realignment probability is never more
than 0.025 per quarter. Given that there are roughly sixty trading days in a
quarter, in Figure 12 the daily realignment probability rises rapidly to over 0.08
per day. So although this example shows that it is possible to avoid the problem
of sustainability, it suggests that one can only do so by assuming
counterfactually high frequencies of realignment.
We argue that the example presented in Figure 11 can be used to provide
at least a partial explanation for the events of the EMS crisis in the autumn of
1992. Its essential features are (i) an initially high level of credibility; (ii) a band
centered on a moderately overvalued exchange rate; (iii) a change in the market’s
perception of the credibility of the band in a situation other than the current one.
This is consistent with the circumstances surrounding the EMS crisis in
September 1992. There had been a steady decline in the frequency of
realignments against the German mark, as illustrated in Figure 13 for the Italian
lira. This had the effect of boosting the credibility of the regime. In addition,
there was no evidence of a decline in credibility as reflected in currency option
prices or interest differentials until very shortly before the crisis (Campa and
Chang, 1995; Malz, 1996; Rose and Svensson, 1994). Finally, the rather moderate
change in credibility required in the event of significant deterioration in the level
of economic activity seems plausible in the light of the strain imposed on EMS
discipline by the effects of German re-unification.
                                                                                                                                                                            
its central parity on at least one day during the two weeks preceding a devaluing
realignment.25
It might be objected that this story ignores a crucial factor, namely the
ability of the government to make a large discrete change in the money supply in
response to a collapse in credibility. In the context of the example in Figure 11, it
would be possible to re-establish the existence of an equilibrium path with a
suitable discrete reduction in money supply, given that πmax is unaffected by the
change in the money supply. But in the more general case where π adjusts
continuously to changes in output that will not happen. The jump in interest
rates will be accompanied by a fall in the level of output, and this in turn will
increase the probability of realignment. So long as the realignment probability
increases sufficiently fast in response to the fall in output, the regime will not be
sustainable. This argument throws further light on why the conventional
wisdom on the use of interest rates to defend a currency band may fail. In the
absence of sustainability problems (and this of course does not rule out the
occurrence of periodic realignments) only small monetary adjustments are
required at the edges of the band. But if a large increase in interest rates occurs in
response to a loss of credibility, the interest rate increase itself accentuates the
loss of credibility because of its impact on output and employment. Thus the
policy of increasing interest rates dramatically in the face of a sudden loss of
credibility may quite easily turn out to be futile, as proved to be the case at the
time of the EMS crisis in 1992.
3.4 Forward-looking Prices
Thus far we have worked with a rather simple form of price adjustment
equation which depends upon the level of contemporaneous excess demand or
supply in the economy. But it could plausibly be argued that in an environment
where the market anticipates realignments of the band, agents should also26
anticipate the effect that these realignments will have on price inflation. One way
of doing this is to modify the price adjustment equation in the following way:
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If the band is correctly aligned about long-run equilibrium, a series of positive
inflationary shocks causes the nominal interest rate to rise, leading to exchange
rate appreciation and falling output. The consequent downward pressure on
prices forces the system back towards long-run equilibrium. But if wage and
price setters in the economy expect a devaluing realignment, this will reduce the
deflationary impact on prices, and this effect will be greater the higher the
probability and the larger the size of the realignment. These considerations are
captured in equation (4’).
We found that introducing this modification to the model had the effect of
narrowing the width of sustainable band by a small margin, but made little
difference to the realignment simulations described below. Consequently we do
not report separate results for this case. The explanation for this finding can be
found by examining the effect on the coefficients of the A matrix. The coefficients
affected are a11 and a12, which have values of -0.1422 and 0.0733 respectively. A
ten per cent probability of a ten per cent devaluation when p = 0.05 and s = -0.05
changes these values only by 0.005. We have already shown that high
realignment probabilities resolve the problem of sustainability, and so we
conclude that our results on sustainability are robust to the introduction of more
realistic forward-looking price setting behavior.
3.5 Monetary Accommodation
Our model assumes that the nominal money supply is held fixed while
the exchange rate remains within the interior of the current band. If a
                                                          
17We are grateful to Marcus Miller for suggesting this formulation.27
realignment occurs,  there is a discrete adjustment in the money supply designed
to move the currency immediately to its PPP value at the midpoint of the new
band. But since we have identified overshooting as the source of the potential
sustainability problem, this suggests that if the price shocks were at least
partially accommodated, then the difficulty would disappear. This indeed turns
out to be the case. We introduce accommodation by reformulating (1) as:
mp y i −− = − () 1 α κ λ (1')
where α is the coefficient of accommodation. If α = 0, there is no accommodation,
and if α = 1, there is complete accommodation and changes in the price level
have no effect on the level of the real money supply. It can then be shown that
there will always exist some value of α < 1 at which the model shifts from
overshooting to undershooting. In the undershooting case the free float solution
(locus SS in Figure 1) is positively sloped. As the price level rises above its long-
run equilibrium value, the nominal exchange rate depreciates, and the
equilibrium path in a partially credible band will be tangent to the weak edge of
the band. Here the intervention to defend the band reinforces rather than
counteracts the interest premium needed to compensate for an expected
devaluing realignment.
However, for the parameter values used to generate the paths in Figure
10, α has to be significantly above 0.9 to ensure the existence of an equilibrium
path. In other words, there has to be a very high degree of monetary
accommodation to real shocks if problems of sustainability of a target zone are to
be avoided. Of course, this result relies upon the assumption that the
realignment probability function is not itself influenced by the change of policy.
In practice, a policy of increased monetary accommodation is likely to be
associated with higher realignment probabilities, and this will have the effect of
reducing the amount of accommodation required.28
3.6 The Simulation of Realignments
In this section we assume that the sustainability problems associated with partial
credibility do not arise. As was demonstrated above, this imposes certain restrictions on
the form of the function π.
18 Given these restrictions, we wish to compare the
performance of the fully credible regime with one in which the market expects that
realignments will occur from time to time. We consider first the effect of introducing
realignment expectations in a situation where the band is symmetrically placed about
long-run equilibrium. It is interesting to compare the upper panel of Figure 2 with Figure
14. The only difference between the two cases is the existence of symmetric realignment
expectations. Despite the fact that the frequency of realignment was only 14.4%, the
distributions of the nominal exchange rate and the exchange rate within the band are
markedly changed.
19 Identical by definition in the fully credible case, the distributions
diverge substantially when realignments are permitted. Both become hump-shaped, as is
observed in the data. But the nominal exchange rate, not surprisingly, becomes
significantly more variable, whereas the exchange rate within the band becomes
significantly less variable. The real exchange rate also becomes significantly less
variable, as does output.
Finally, Figure 15 plots the mean and the 5
th and 95
th percentiles of the
distributions of the variables over time. When compared with Figure 4 it shows clearly
how periodic realignment increases the speed of adjustment. It is of course not surprising
that there should be some effect given the nature of realignment rule we have assumed.
However, the magnitude of the effect is a consequence of the endogenous adjustment of
the realignment probability. Realignments occur when they are most needed i.e. when
relying on the process of automatic adjustment associated with a fully credible band
would lead to prolonged periods when output was far from its full employment level.
                                                          
18 In the simulations we interpret π as the realignment probability per period, which
requires us to restrict its value to be less than one.
19The parameters for π needed to generate this frequency were: a = 0.35, b = 0.03, k =
100.The frequency of 14.4% is not unrealistic in the light of ERM experience where there
were six realignments of the French franc against the DM over a period of fourteen years.29
What this analysis suggests is that, although a target zone may be a
desirable regime for limiting exchange rate variability when central parities are
close to being correctly aligned, it is not particularly well-suited to dealing with
significant misalignments. The period of adjustment is likely to be lengthy and
the consequent pressures for a realignment ultimately overwhelming. This is an
argument for reconsidering the original target zone proposal put forward by
Williamson (1985), that envisaged a band on the real exchange rate. Such an
arrangement avoids the accumulating pressure for large discrete changes in
central parity by allowing for more frequent adjustments at the margins of the
real exchange rate band.
4. Summary and Conclusion
We have analyzed a model of a target zone that explicitly incorporates
sluggish price adjustment and the formation of endogenous realignment
expectations based on a policy rule for the government which weighs the cost of
realignment against the benefit of a quicker return to full employment. We show
that the process of adjustment towards equilibrium in the case of a fully credible
band is rather slow. This suggests that a realistic model of a target zone must
incorporate a realignment process that is driven by economic fundamentals. We
consider the case where the government faces random fixed costs in the event of
a realignment, and trades off those costs against the benefits of a realignment
designed to return the nominal exchange rate to PPP and output to its full
employment level. This produces a probability of realignment that increases with
deviations of output from its full employment level. When the probability of
realignment is low, and relatively insensitive to changes in economic
fundamentals, bands of a width which have been observed in the EMS may
become unsustainable, in the sense that there is no intervention policy which can
be used to defend the band successfully. We suggest that the model may provide
at least a partial explanation for the EMS crisis. In particular, we are able to30
explain the observation that the crisis occurred when credibility was historically
high and when the level of fundamentals at the time did not seem to warrant it.
A policy of monetary accommodation can alleviate the problem of
sustainability. But this is possible only at the cost of a severe curtailment in the
ability of a country to pursue counterinflationary measures within the band.
Finally, we show that even relatively infrequent realignments can markedly
speed the process of adjustment to misalignment, indicating that a policy of
attempting to maintain high credibility in the face of substantial shocks may
ultimately prove self-defeating.31
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The free float solution.
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Parameter values for the simulation of the model.
Parameter γκηλ φ σ
value 0.152 0.225 0.114 1.419 0.6 0.004
0.2 0.007
All parameters except φ and σ are taken from Ghosh and Masson (1991).2
Figure 2
The distribution of the exchange rate for a perfectly credible band: σ = .007
(upper panel) and σ = .004 (lower panel).35
Figure 3
Distributions for a wide band (upper panel, σ = .007) and a misaligned band
 (lower panel, σ = .004).36
Figure 4
The speed of adjustment to misalignment (φ = .6)37
Figure 5
The speed of adjustment to misalignment (φ = .2)1
Figure 6
The stable saddlepath for the deterministic model with a step function for the realignment
probability
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Figure 7
Equilibrium paths for the stochastic model with a step function for the realignment
probability when the probability is small.
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Figure 8
An example of a maximal bandwidth
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Figure 9
Equilibrium paths for the stochastic model with a step function for the realignment
probability when the probability is large.
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 Figure 10
A critical sustainable bandwidth; equilibrium paths for the exchange rate















Parameter values are as in Table 1, except that φ = 0.5, σ = 0.008.  Also, a = 1, b = 0 and
k = 1.43
Figure 11
An unsustainable band with variable realignment probability: the case of an overvalued
central parity































Parameter values are as in Table 1, except that φ = 0.5, σ = 0.008.44
Figure 12
The shift from overshooting to undershooting with high realignment probability















Parameter values are as in Table 1, except that φ = 0.5, σ = 0.008. Also, a = 5, b = 0, k =
1000.45
Figure 13
The ITL/DEM exchange rate and its central parity within the exchange rate mechanism
of the EMS: 1979-199346
Figure 14
A target zone with endogenous expectations.1
Figure 15
Speed of adjustment with realignment (φ=0.6).